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I. INTRODUCTION 
At numerous points throughout history, a development or human 
achievement has arrived, prospered, and evolved so quickly that the law and 
society generally find themselves hard-pressed to keep abreast of it.  The 
automobile, the telephone, and various computer-based technologies—from the 
punch card-chomping, room-filling beast of the 1960s to the lithe smartphones 
that denizens of the 2010s carry—all share one thing in common: the tidal wave-
sized body of new jurisprudence, legal questions, and regulation of commerce 
                                                            
1 J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law 2015.  Auburn University, B.A. Political Science, 
2012.  Special thanks to my journal editor, writing instructors, and all other peers, friends, and 
professors who have offered any input or advice on this topic and Note.  Thanks are also in order to 
Pandora and other streaming radio services, which not only served as the interesting subject matter 
for this discussion but also provided the background music while writing this Note. 
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relating to their use.  The most recent participant in this group, and the subject of 
this Note, might be said without much exaggeration to be of comparable 
importance to some of the other inventions mentioned above: the advent of web-
based streaming music, web radio, and collectively the arrival of “new media.”2 
While consumers have responded to the advent of these services and 
inventions with rabid appetites,3 the financial and regulatory fates of those 
providing the services are less certain.  Some of this instability might certainly 
be attributed to the fledging financial model involved even without the question 
of regulation; like the monetization trials and tribulations of others, such as 
Facebook and Google, it is another new industry continuing to seek its proper 
footing.4  Another facet of the industry’s meteoric rise to prominence, as well as 
its continued collision with rights-holders and those suspicious of the business 
model, is the new media streaming model’s effectiveness at combating so-called 
music “piracy.”  The ability of such services to profit from this piracy trend is 
largely thanks to their unique service model, which aims to provide access to 
popular music and media at no cost to the consumer, providing an attractive, 
legal alternative to piracy that is still theoretically capable of adequately 
reimbursing the artists and rights-holders.5  However, the problems inherent in 
                                                            
2 Author Andrew Stockment offers a concise and helpful definition of what web or streaming 
radio is within the text of the Virginia Law Review: 
‘Internet radio’ refers to non-interactive audio webcasts.  A webcast is the 
[I]nternet equivalent of a broadcast—the transmission of . . . digital audio . . . 
[I]nternet radio is the non-interactive streaming of music or other audio 
programming.  It functions like traditional broadcast radio: the webcaster 
selects which songs the listener hears and listeners are not able to select the 
songs that are played.   
Andrew Stockment, Internet Radio: The Case for A Technology Neutral Royalty Standard, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 2129, 2132 (2009) (citing WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, 
AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT, 17–18 (2004)). 
3 See infra note 13. 
4 Contributing authors to a recent Forbes online report regarding Pandora’s stock valuation 
related to its profitability highlights some of the problems and questions facing it and similar online 
new media providers: A user base that outpaces profitability without new monetization strategies.  
Specific to Pandora, the authors point out that the burgeoning shift of user popularity from the 
desktop version of the site to the mobile version that can be installed on modern smartphones and 
listened to on the go requires a re-examination of the optimal advertising and licensing methods.  
Trefis Team, Taking a Closer Look at Pandora’s Monetization Strategy, FORBES (Jun. 14, 2012, 
8:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/06/14/taking-a-closer-look-at-
pandoras-monetization-strategy/; see generally Pandora: Momentum Continues as Mobile 
Monetization Efforts Pay Off, SEEKING ALPHA (Nov. 22, 2013, 6:49 PM), http://seekingalpha. 
com/article/1858871-pandora-momentum-continues-as-mobile-monetization-efforts-pay-off. 
5 Neil S. Tyler, Music Piracy and Diminishing Revenues: How Compulsory Licensing for 
Interactive Webcasters Can Lead the Recording Industry Back to Prominence, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
2101, 2106–16 (2013) (describing generally the effects that online music piracy has had on the 
music and radio industries, and how the rise of online services, including streaming services such as 
Pandora, offer new ways to combat piracy and maximize profits for artists and labels). 
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the last goal, as this Note aims to illustrate, are more complex than they might 
appear. 
Specifically, this Note focuses on that side of the “new media” chronicle, 
the issues and progress, or perhaps regress, in antitrust law, organizations 
representing artists, and how revenue from businesses like Pandora should be 
shared.  In doing so, this Note will examine how the use, and perhaps misuse, of 
old law and jurisprudence as it pertains to old-fashioned or “terrestrial” radio 
had played a part in the new media story and helped shape the current regulatory 
scheme, and what the use, or misuse, of that scheme might mean for provider, 
artist, label, and consumer alike.  The titular case, In re. Pandora Media,6 sets 
what the Author believes is a troublesome precedent in the standoff in which the 
streaming radio industry—here specifically Pandora Media, Inc. (Pandora)—
finds itself.  The question of who will, or who should, budge first begs the 
examination of all the players involved: The venerable American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) accompanied by the Department 
of Justice’s oversight using an evolving but century-old antitrust regime, and 
Pandora, who continues to strive for a more terrestrial, radio-like treatment of 
licensing and performance fees by leaning on that antitrust regime.7 
Before beginning to follow the breadcrumbs that lead back to the origins 
of disputes among radio stations and ASCAP, this Note would be remiss to not 
first disassemble the burgeoning “new media” field of Internet streaming radio 
and other entertainment that has given rise to the question addressed.  This 
examination includes how web radio burst onto the scene with Pandora among 
its first wave of major players, leading them eventually into a position to create 
the complex antitrust and licensing question.  These points of discussion will 
comprise the background portion of this Note.8 
This Note will then examine the lengthy thread of legal reasoning that 
leads us to the specific question addressed in this Note.9  To do so, it is not 
necessary to look to the most recent iteration of the technology involved—
though the legal questions at play do inexorably impact modern Internet and 
device usage, the roots of the jurisprudence involved can be traced as far back as 
the earlier decades of the twentieth century.10 
Next, this Note will discuss the details and arguments presented in the 
titular case of In re Pandora Media, Inc., drawing conclusions as to what the 
                                                            
6 In re Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 5211927, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013). 
7 Id. at *1–3.  
8 See infra Part II and accompanying notes 13–23. 
9 See infra Part III and accompanying notes 24–39. 
10 See generally George L. Blum, Annotation, Judicial Decisions Involving ASCAP, 37 A.L.R. 
6th 243 (2008) (describing comprehensively the history of litigation and regulation involving 
ASCAP, spanning from 1941 to 2013). 
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verdict and pending follow-up case might mean more immediately for Pandora 
and ASCAP, but also for the industry as a whole.11  Specifically, this Note will 
adopt the position that the actions of both sides are impeding forward legal and 
business progress in the new media streaming radio area.12  In doing so, this 
Note will argue that the antitrust regulation and blanket licensing agreement 
drawn upon by Pandora is artificially attempting to retain certain vestigial 
elements of the industry from terrestrial radio, including perhaps the acceptance 
of ASCAP’s general licensing and reimbursement scheme as it relates to the 
performance right versus portion of revenue schemes of reimbursement. 
Besides linking this argument to the specific cases passed down by the 
New York courts involving Pandora Inc., this Note will then apply the same 
argumentation to support the broader point that antitrust law and the courts’ 
examination of its application to new media, and even the Internet generally, 
potentially stifles innovation and prevents the market from demonstrating the 
difference and fluidity of the Internet in adapting to new markets and negotiation 
platforms.  To answer this problem, this Note will finally posit and argue that, 
although a precise regulatory solution might not be in sight, the market and 
surrounding interests in the areas of new media, the Internet, and copyright 
holders’ interests provide enough kinetic energy to generate a mutually-
acceptable new solution if the barricades of the current disputes and situations 
are lowered.  
II.  FROM A TRICKLE TO A TORRENT: THE HISTORY AND RE-POSITIONING OF 
PANDORA AND WEB-BASED “NEW MEDIA” 
After the advent of the Internet, the development of web locations 
providing access to audio and video files occurred rapidly.  While at first there 
was very little online that would be accurately described as “radio,” as early as 
the 1990s various web events, including simulcasts of other television events, 
concerts, and even talk radio, began to appear.13  Pandora’s own story began as 
something not at all resembling its current iteration, as a tech startup and idea 
for a music selection engine in the Silicon Valley in the 1990s.14 
                                                            
11 See infra Part IV and accompanying notes 40–78. 
12 See infra Part V and accompanying notes 79–102. 
13 Randy Alfred, This Day in Tech, WIRED (Jun. 24, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.wired. 
com/thisdayintech/2009/06/dayintech_0624/. 
14 Stephanie Clifford, Pandora’s Long Strange Trip, INC., http://www.inc.com/magazine/2007 
1001/pandoras-long-strange-trip.html (last updated Oct. 1, 2007).  While not originally planned as a 
web radio service, Pandora’s original innovation, which served as the inceptive core of its 
business—and notably still offers a unique experience to its present-day listeners—is the music 
selection algorithm known as the “music genome project.”  Id.  This technology allowed Pandora to 
further distance its offerings from those in the world of terrestrial radio, allowing listeners to create a 
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Though most privy law students and other denizens of the twenty-first 
century probably need little or no introduction to the specific subject matter 
being discussed, the simply staggering rise and subsequent market dominance of 
new media and streaming is worth noting nonetheless.15  Aside from the specific 
story of Pandora web radio discussed below, collectively the entire new media 
market for video and music has forever changed the way consumers pay for and 
receive digital content and entertainment.16 
As Pandora’s web radio model was eventually rolled out and the number 
of users began to exponentially pour in,17 questions of profitability18 and 
licensing also began to arrive on Pandora’s doorstep.19  Also influential in 
changing the company’s approach and lobby was the news their current business 
model would be potentially weighed down further by the actions of the 
Copyright Royalty Board and SoundExchange, taking action that made online 
radio streaming of individual songs more expensive for the station than its 
                                                            
“station” that would play all of their favorite artists or tracks across genres.  Id. 
15 Subscription and streaming services experienced tremendous growth and accounted for 15% 
of record business revenue in 2012, according to RIAA statistics released Tuesday.  That expansion 
helped digital revenue surge to 59% of total recorded music revenue from 51% last year but could 
not prevent total revenue from slipping 1% last year.   Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: Streaming, 
Subscriptions Rising, But Total Recorded-Music Revenues Down 1% in 2012: RIAA Report, 
BILLBOARD (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/155 
4501/business-matters-streaming-subscriptions-rising-but. 
16 According to web-based news source Tech Crunch, “television is in trouble.”  Josh Constine, 
100 Million Americans Watch Online Video Per Day, Up 43% Since 2010, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 9, 
2012) http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/09/100-million-american-watch-video/.  Some “105.1 million 
Americans now watch videos online each day, up 43% from 73.7 million in 2010.”  Id.  Though 
these numbers refer to streaming video entertainment, including the delivery of television programs 
and movies, the comparison between the analog bulwark of cable and broadcast television and the 
new trend is directly applicable to the discussion of Pandora and its licensing woes brought on by its 
similar success. 
17 “Pandora launched in September 2005.  After a quiet rollout to friends and family, the 
company had to double capacity three times in the first week.  ‘Nobody—nobody—had dreamed it 
would be as popular as it was . . . . ’”  Clifford, supra note 10. 
18 Even today, perhaps shockingly to some who might be familiar on a personal level with the 
service, Pandora’s business model still does not produce a profit.  “Despite not turning an annual 
profit in its seven-year history, Pandora continues to survive by increasing its user base across 
multiple platforms.  Since 2010, it has launched on over two hundred consumer electronic devices 
including [b]lu-[r]ay players, smartphones, and cars.”  Jasmine A. Braxton, Lost in Translation: The 
Obstacles of Streaming Digital Media and the Future of Transnational Licensing, 36 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 193, 201 (2014). 
19 Clifford, supra note 10.  
[Pandora’s] business model turned out . . . to be not so cool.  Pandora offered 
listeners [ten] hours for free before requiring them to subscribe, but users 
easily could log in with different e-mail addresses and continue getting the 
free version . . . .  Pandora scrapped the subscription model and decided to 
make money via advertisements on its site.  
Id. 
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terrestrial counterparts.20  While these actions and others generally related to the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) began to weigh down the upward 
development and spread of web radio and other streaming media alike, the 
distinction of requiring a “performance license” for each play of a web radio 
song—dictating higher fees to be paid through to the rights-holders—is what set 
off the bulk of litigation and legal questions involving Pandora and the likes of 
ASCAP.21 
Notably for the central argument to be discussed within this Note, it is 
perhaps clear that, to some degree, even from the start of legislation involving 
reimbursement of rights holders and web radio, different treatment of such web 
radio stations when it came to licensing might have arisen not purely from a 
difference in accountability and technology, but perhaps from a general mistrust 
and sense that the Internet stations posed a threat to the old guard of terrestrial 
radio.22  Even if not specifically or explicitly endorsed by the courts, the wieldy 
regime of nearly a century’s worth of antitrust and licensing precedent involving 
the likes of ASCAP was born atop the towers of terrestrial radio, so perhaps, 
regardless of motivations, it should be little surprise that the courts saw fit to try 
to shoehorn those same precedents and standards onto the new, and markedly 
different, web radio era heralded by Pandora.23 
III. JUDICIAL BACKGROUND INVOLVING PANDORA AND ASCAP PRIOR TO IN RE 
PANDORA 
Litigation involving ASCAP and distributors of media content has its 
origins long before the advent of Internet radio, indeed, even before the Internet 
itself, color television, and modern radio bands.24  Unsurprisingly for an 
                                                            
20 Id. 
21 See Tyler, supra note 5, at 2118–27 (explaining the history of the DMCA and treatment of 
performance licensing for Internet radio, and arguing for a new category of license).  For a general 
description of courts’ legal reasoning to arrive at the decision that performance of pieces contained 
within the repertoire or blanket license granted to radio stations by organizations including ASCAP, 
see HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 5:197.50 (2014). 
22 For one example supporting this possible motivating factor, consider the comments of Neil S. 
Tyler: “By creating a new digital public performance right for sound recordings and broadening the 
compulsory license structure to address the proliferation of webcasting and online music 
downloading, the DPRSRA recognized and attempted to respond to the perceived threat that the 
Internet presented to the music industry.”  Tyler, supra note 5, at 2119 (citing AL KOHN & BOB 
KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 1295–96 (3d ed. 2002)). 
23 Id. 
24 See generally Blum, supra note 8, at § 2 (listing all judicial decisions involving ASCAP). 
In 1941, a consent decree was entered into between the government and 
ASCAP that required ASCAP to grant licenses to users in proportion to the 
amount of music used, and, in 1950, that decree was substantially amended to 
remedy certain deficiencies.  Under the 1950 amended judgment, ASCAP was 
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organization of ASCAP’s arguable importance, size, and influence, within not 
only the music and entertainment industry but collectively all of the other 
industries touched by that industry, the power and purpose of the licenses 
controlled and issued by ASCAP have drawn continuous and increasingly 
nuanced attention from the courts.25 
Throughout the years, courts have addressed diverse and complex issues 
on nearly every conceivable legal front as it relates to the burgeoning licensing 
behemoth that is ASCAP.  In the words of the American Law Reports collection 
addressing all of those cases, “The nature of the organization and practices of . . 
. ASCAP[] is revealed in the reports of cases to which it has been a party,” 
referencing that level of diversity and complexity.26 
In terms of the courts recognizing a need to sit up and take notice of what 
was and is transpiring with mass licensing and ASCAP to radio stations and 
other customers and applications, the judicial history stretches back as far as 
1932, when the Supreme Court first had to recognize that what was then a still 
current and developing technology of the age—radio performances in the 
home—presented an interesting problem for both the development of copyright 
law as a whole, as well as the organizations that quickly began to emerge to 
respond to the market, including ASCAP.27  Some of the language presented by 
the court in the opinion rings shockingly current for the issues faced in the 
instant case: 
But[,] nothing in the [Copyright Act] circumscribes the meaning to be attributed 
to the term “performance,” or prevents a single rendition of a copyrighted 
selection from resulting in more than one public performance for profit.  While 
this may not have been possible before the development of radio broadcasting, 
the novelty of the means used does not lessen the duty of the courts to give full 
protection to the monopoly of public performance for profit which Congress has 
secured to the composer.28 
                                                            
required to offer two types of licenses to the broadcasters: a “blanket” license 
and a “per program” license.   
Id. 
25 The “blanket license” issued by ASCAP is the bread and butter of not only this case but also 
of ASCAP’s function in general from the inception of the license to the present.  See Licensing Help, 
ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/licensing/licensingfaq.aspx#general (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) 
(“One of the greatest advantages of the ASCAP license is that it gives you the right to perform ANY 
or ALL of the millions of the musical works in our repertory.  Whether your music is live, broadcast, 
transmitted[,] or played via CD’s or videos, your ASCAP license covers your performances.  And[,] 
with one license fee, ASCAP saves you the time, expense, and burden of contacting thousands of 
copyright owners.”). 
26 Blum, supra note 8, at § 2. 
27 See generally, Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 197 (1931). 
28 Id. at 196–97. 
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While much of the subsequent and even presently ongoing litigation 
surrounding ASCAP encompasses other issues, such as scope, antitrust, and 
various other sundries, a consistent theme is the courts wrestling with the issue 
of mass licensing flowing from the eventual cabal of Broadcast Music, Inc. 
(BMI) and ASCAP in North America, tempered by the arrival of new 
technologies and questions in the mediums used for continued broadcast and 
“public performance.”29 
Yet another case presented on the long, strange road that ASCAP has 
travelled that bears heavy foreshadowing for the more modern issues faced by 
the organization can be found in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. ASCAP 
hailing from 1972.30  In that case, the plaintiffs’ complaint generally was that the 
broadcasters chose to complain that: 
[T]he availability of ASCAP’s blanket and per program licenses was not 
sufficient to satisfy the commands of the Sherman Antitrust Act, with CBS 
contending that these options “compel a broadcaster to pay for the right to use 
all copyrighted music in the ASCAP pool, even though it might want rights only 
as to some of those musical compositions.”  That is, the plaintiff asserted that 
ASCAP is “using the leverage inherent in its copyright pool to insist that 
plaintiff pay royalties on a basis which does not bear any relationship to the 
amount of music performed.31 
Again, the commonalities between the decades-gone Columbia and the 
present In re Pandora and related litigation are readily apparent.  Despite taking 
place in the 1970s, long before the Internet, Pandora, and the rise of “new 
media,” Columbia nonetheless raises some of the same familiar complaints or 
tensions that lurk beneath the surface of the instant case.  Specifically, the same 
grievance that Columbia offered before the court regarding the inability of 
Columbia or its peers to effectively shop for meaningful rates, rather than pay a 
flat fee, did not accurately represent both the antitrust law and the needs of the 
market in the best way possible.32  The parallels to Pandora’s interest in the 
present is obvious: both the convoluted and perhaps misapplied methods of 
calculating profits and cost for the blanket license, but, from a broader view, 
also the actions Pandora has taken in an attempt to maintain its business interests 
against the bulwark of ASCAP licensing, just as Columbia did in 1972.33 
On the more recent stage is the tussle that comprised the better part of 
                                                            
29 See generally Blum, supra note 8. 
30 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 337 F. Supp. 
394, (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
31 Blum, supra note 8, at § 27 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 337 F. Supp. at 396). 
32 Id. 
33 See Tyler, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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Pandora’s infancy along with its quickly-appearing peers, such as LastFM, 
Spotify, and other streaming services: The distinction between “interactive” and 
“non-interactive” services within the larger sphere of web-based streaming.  
This determination serves foremost as the determinative factor in the eyes of the 
courts for whether the old radio blanket license applied or whether individually 
song-based statutory royalties were due.34  While the technologies involved in 
the various services are notably different and in some cases admittedly 
unprecedented—such as Pandora’s advertised “DNA” algorithms that provide a 
constantly-refreshed station using musical qualities deduced from a song, artist, 
or album of the user’s choice—another view of the court’s unwillingness to 
initially view the use of Pandora as similar to terrestrial radio for purposes of 
licensing might be construed as a hesitancy to change the “old guard” of that 
regime for something more suited to the nuances of web radio.35 
This theory finds support in the self-interests of record labels and other 
similar content providers who stand to gain the most from keeping music 
licensing “close to the chest.”  For them, physical media—not Internet and 
distribution—would define the parameters of licensing.  Consider the thoughts 
of author Jasmine Braxton on the sum total that this conflict of interests has had 
on Pandora’s financial and business fate and how that fate might serve as 
sufficient motivation for Pandora to strive for change and a leaner arrangement: 
As a non[-]interactive webcaster, Pandora pays two types of performance 
royalties: statutory performance royalties for the sound recording and 
performance royalties for the underlying composition. . . . [S]tatutory 
performance royalties for digital music are paid to the nonprofit organization 
SoundExchange, which collects the royalties and disperses them back out to 
artists and record companies.  Writers’ royalties are paid out to the PROs 
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC.  Unlike satellite radio providers like Sirius, which 
pay a percentage of its revenue as performance royalties, Pandora pays a per-
stream fee every time a song is played.  This “willing buyer, willing seller” 
model is still based on the statutory rate[] but does not account for the internal 
performance of the company.  As a result, Pandora paid out royalties of [60%, 
50%, and 54%] of its revenue in fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012 respectively.  
Unfortunately, while Pandora is one of the first radio systems to fairly pay 
                                                            
34 Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 2009).  The Second 
Circuit looked to the statutory definition of “interactive” and “non-interactive” to categorize the 
program and establish any liability.  Id.  “[A]n interactive service is defined as a service that ‘enables 
a member of the public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or 
on request . . . .’”  Id.  Otherwise, if a digital audio transmission is not interactive, its primary 
purpose is to “provide to the public such audio or other entertainment programming, . . . subject to a 
compulsory or statutory licensing fee.”  Id. at 151.  Thus, the court had to determine if a webcasting 
service was interactive based on whether the user could receive a transmission specially created for 
him or her. 
35 See infra note 36. 
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record companies and artists, the payments are essentially killing the company.36 
Myriad views and commentary exist in response to the call for a better 
alternative to the scheme described above.37  All similarities between the other 
varieties of streaming and web-based media aside, however, the clear picture 
and circumstance in which the actions and opinion of In re Pandora are handed 
down is one that makes things difficult, if not impossible, for ideal measures of 
market success.  Companies such as Pandora would likely fall back on the 
complexities of the ASCAP and BMI dispute as it interfaces between web and 
physical radio regulation, instead of allowing in the influences of market forces: 
There are a few interactive webcasters, such as Rhapsody and Spotify, that have 
had relative success under the current digital performance right framework.  
However, the vast majority of popular music services offered to the general 
public today are non[-]interactive, due to the lower royalty rates owed to 
copyright owners and the presence of compulsory licensing for non[-]interactive 
webcasters.  Creating a successful interactive webcasting service is not 
impossible under the current framework, but the increased costs associated with 
direct negotiations and the need to acquire streaming rights from a wide variety 
of copyright owners means that only a small number of entities are even capable 
of pursuing such a business plan.38 
After one reaches an appreciation that this is the reality in which Pandora 
and similar new media companies have found themselves forced to participate 
in, the eventuality of a case such as In re Pandora that brings these discussions 
to the forefront and begs a solution or regulatory scheme is hardly surprising.39 
                                                            
36 Jasmine A. Braxton, Lost in Translation: The Obstacles of Streaming Digital Media and the 
Future of Transnational Licensing, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 193, 199–200 (2014) 
(footnotes omitted). 
37 Braxton offers her own potential reform suggestions through examples of other streaming 
services on the multinational stage.  While her focus is on that aspect of licensing versus streaming 
radio and ASCAP regulation, the discussion of market forces serving as the driving force behind the 
shape of reform is highly applicable: 
Granting performance rights for audiovisual works such as film and television 
programs is not nearly as contentious as obtaining similar rights for music . . . 
[a]s owners of these works studios negotiate licenses directly with potential 
service providers, and, like record labels, prefer to charge high licensing fees 
upfront to compensate for lackluster physical sales.  As a result Netflix may 
offer television series and film collections from a certain group of studios 
while growing competitor Amazon may host content from another handful of 
producers. 
Id. 
38 Tyler, supra note 5, at 2122–23. 
39 While Pandora has doubtless established a fervent user base for itself with its current business 
model and interface utilizing seeded web radio stations, the market presence of companies such as 
Pandora as opposed to other related but not identical services, such as Spotify, can accurately be said 
to be the product of the current regulatory scheme more than market forces and demand: “Based 
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IV. THE TITULAR DECISION, IN RE PANDORA, AND SUBSEQUENT COURT ACTIONS 
The opinion, delivered by District Court Judge Denise Cote, began with 
background information immediately prior to the case.  Judge Cote described 
how Pandora sought a blanket license in 2010 from ASCAP, effective upon 
January 1, 2011.40  The judge went on to describe in rough terms the agreement 
comprising the blanket license and noting generally Pandora’s asserted cause of 
action that it should be allowed to continue to play all songs initially contained 
in the license, notwithstanding action taken on behalf of several of the groups of 
artists within the blanket who later moved that performance rights for their 
pieces be excluded from performance on “new media” including Pandora.41 
By way of giving further facts and background, the court also examined 
the history of licensing between Pandora and ASCAP specifically prior to this 
ruling.42  The court described the original 2005 agreement into which the parties 
entered.43  The court noted Pandora withdrew from this original agreement 
pending a change in the antitrust ruling affecting ASCAP, upon which Pandora 
                                                            
upon the current tripartite structure of the DMCA, it is extremely advantageous for an Internet radio 
provider to qualify for the non[-]interactive webcasting compulsory license and forego the high 
transaction costs of negotiating directly with sound recording copyright owners for the right to offer 
music to consumers.”  Id. 
40 In re Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 5211927, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013).  The general 
litigation against ASCAP by the United States in cases such as United States v. American Society of 
Composers, Authors & Publishers, 616 F. Supp. 2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), addressed more broadly 
the fairness of such a blanket license.  Though the “new media” medium in question in the 
aforementioned case was Internet streaming video service, the opinion still contains useful 
commentary on what the courts might consider a fair application of blanket license to disputes 
involving new media.  Senior District Court Judge Conner stated in conclusion regarding the 
revenue fee agreement for the blanket license: 
Even considering that the fees paid to ASCAP will represent only about one-
half of the total fees that YouTube pays to music performing rights societies, 
the contemplated interim fees are clearly reasonable, even conservative, in 
comparison to those called for in other licenses for the performance of 
copyrighted content on the Internet.  
Id. at 455.  To some readers, including the Author, this might seem to suggest, along with other 
material discussed in this Note, that courts are more willing to allow compensation to rights-holders 
either through an organization or directly to be judged for “fairness” by looking to prior agreements, 
both in new media and without—in the case of Pandora and terrestrial radio.  Id. 
41 In re Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 5211927 at *1–2.  Notably, the first and subsequent 
publishers to request that new media performance of their licenses be excluded from the blanket 
resulted in direct renegotiation efforts between EMI (now known as Sony/EMI), Warner Brothers 
Group, Universal Music Publishing Group, and BMG.  Though Pandora sought the summary 
judgment later granted by the New York court, the fact that Pandora willingly was able to engage 
each of the publishers in individual negotiations might give some room to speculate about the nature 
of the ideal level of regulation both without ASCAP’s monopoly as well as Pandora’s reliance on 
previous antitrust rulings.  See id. at *3.  
42 Id. at *2. 
43 Id. 
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filed for the new agreement here at issue under the new terms.44 
Pandora’s petition filed for purposes of determining reasonable licensing 
fees contains its own summary of the problem as it affects the entity at this point 
in the description: 
The EMI and Sony New Media [r]ights [w]ithdrawals have important 
ramifications for Pandora.  Of course, it has created an urgent need on Pandora’s 
part to negotiate direct licenses with the EMI and Sony.  That is because, as a 
practical matter, Pandora cannot effectively operate the kind of comprehensive 
[I]nternet radio offering which it currently delivers to its end users without 
access to the huge catalogs of EMI and Sony.  Beyond the foregoing, it is critical 
to Pandora that its ASCAP fees be diminished by a factor commensurate with 
Pandora’s payment obligations to EMI, Sony[,] and any other publisher that may 
withdraw catalog from ASCAP (collectively the “[w]ithdrawing [p]ublishers”).  
Pandora has made specific proposals to ASCAP for how such commensurate 
reductions could be calculated during the parties’ negotiations after EMI’s New 
Media Rights Withdrawal was announced.  ASCAP, nevertheless, has not made 
any meaningful or reasonable proposal to address this issue.45 
Judge Cote explained in brief the already-discussed antitrust law affecting 
ASCAP, how the most recent revision called AFJ2 affected that law, and how 
by result a new blanket license became a more appealing option for Pandora 
following AFJ2: 
Since 1941, ASCAP has been operating under a consent decree stemming from a 
Department of Justice antitrust lawsuit that alleged monopolization of 
performance rights licenses.  Since then, ASCAP has been governed by this 
consent decree, which has been modified from time to time.  The most recent 
version of the consent decree was issued in 2001 and is known as the Second 
Amended Final Judgment (“AFJ2”).46 
The court then explained how this newest revision affected ASCAP’s 
operations and licensing, notably focusing on how AFJ2 provided that the “rate 
court”—District Court for the Southern District of New York—was to govern 
the determination of what is a “reasonable fee” for the blanket license.47  The 
court went on to add a few more details regarding AFJ2 and how it affected the 
various types of licenses: 
                                                            
44 Id. 
45 Petition of Pandora Media, Inc. for the Determination of Reasonable License Fees, In re 
Petition of Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 5211927 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013) (No. 12 CV 8035), 
2012 WL 5388715. 
46 In re Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 5211927, at *1. 
47 Id.  Consider also the point raised in this Note in note 15 and the accompanying text.  Here, as 
in the referenced case, it seems that the court’s standard of reasonability is founded squarely—and 
perhaps primarily—on previous decisions, including those which bear ASCAP’s peers as parties. 
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AFJ2 also sets out the characteristics of the licenses ASCAP issues.  The AFJ2 
defines four types of licenses: blanket licenses, per-program licenses, per-
segment licenses, and through-to-the-audience licenses.  Three of the provisions 
create categories of licenses, which are distinguished in how user fees to ASCAP 
are calculated.  Importantly, these license categories do not affect the scope of 
the ASCAP music repertory available to a licensee.  All of the license types 
contemplate that the user will have access to ASCAP’s entire repertory.48 
The court also noted the AFJ2 ruling provided ASCAP shall not be 
allowed to discriminate in regards to pricing for similarly situated licensees. 49 
The court then began to describe the actions that took place after the 
renegotiation of licensing between Pandora and ASCAP, followed by the 
attempted withholding of performance rights from the blanket license by artist 
groups, such as EMI.50  After giving the legal standard under which summary 
judgment might have been granted in the case, the court then proceeded with its 
substantive analysis, consisting mostly of questions of definition under the 
language of the AFJ2 ruling.51 
The court stated the key issue in its determination was “determining the 
proper meaning of the term ‘works in the ASCAP repertory’ in AFJ2”—as all 
licenses, by language of the AFJ2 ruling, purported to offer the licensee access 
to the “full repertory” of music therein.52  The court cited further language from 
the AFJ2 ruling which in its view made amply clear that the grant of right to 
play all music in the repertory was not limited by re-negotiation between a 
rights-holder and ASCAP after the date of the license application, and that the 
question more narrowly was then what comprised the “atomic unit” of the 
repertory granted under the license: 
[T]he question is whether AFJ2 conceives of the atomic unit of the “ASCAP 
repertory” in terms of musical compositions, or in terms of ASCAP’s right to 
                                                            
48 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The three types of licenses 
mentioned by the court above do not affect the question at issue in In re Pandora, rather they dictate 
the type of blanket license, the choice among which would be largely dictated by the use of the 
media, such as a web show segment in place of web radio.  In the case cited by the Southern District 
of New York court, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc., 683 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 2012), the court 
there references the various types of license which ASCAP might potentially issue: (1) “blanket 
licenses,” such as the one at dispute in the instant case, (2) “per-program licenses,” which envision 
an arrangement where the broadcasts are separated by program but the use is unlimited, (3) “per-
segment license,” similar to the previous but based upon use within segmented portions of the 
licensee’s activity with a single industry, and finally (4) “through–to–the–audience license,” 
meaning a license for use of music in a sort of content “object” that might be transmitted from one 
music user to another.  Id. at 43–44. 
49 In re Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 5211927, at *2. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at *3–5. 
52 Id. at *5. 
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license musical compositions to particular types of purchasers.  The parties 
disagree on this question: 
 . . . .  ASCAP argues that “‘ASCAP repertory’ refers only to the rights in 
musical works that ASCAP has been granted by its members as of a particular 
moment in time.”  Pandora argues that “ASCAP repertory” is a “defined term[ ] 
articulated in terms of ‘works’ or ‘compositions,’ as opposed to in terms of a 
gerrymandered parcel of ‘rights.’”  Pandora is correct.53 
The court stated several principles, which it asserted supported the 
conclusion that Pandora’s view of the ASCAP repertory was more accurate.54  
First, the court reasoned, “in interpreting the meaning of terms in a consent 
decree, plain meaning [took] precedence over imputed purpose.”55  Further, the 
court fell back upon a broader Supreme Court ruling, which emphasized that 
courts “should be reluctant to look beyond text to purpose,” as the decree itself 
contained no such purpose, but rather the text of the decree most concisely 
embodied the intended purpose of the parties entering into the decree.56 
The court’s heavy reliance on originalism principles of law and its textual 
interpretations are important for the reasons stemming from the contrast of the 
court’s reasoning in In re Pandora and a closely-related ruling.57  They are also 
important for providing insight as to the possibility that courts are still a bit 
unwilling to alter the longstanding—modified, but unmoved—antitrust rulings 
and body of other substantive law that support ASCAP’s business model and 
allow for fairly straightforward and conclusory opinions, such as the one seen in 
In re Pandora. 
Unsurprisingly, ASCAP responded negatively against the ultimate 
outcome of the initial In re Pandora ruling, stating that it was optimistic the 
upcoming rights determination ruling to be held in December of 2013 would 
uphold its “fundamental position” that any license should offer “fair pay for [its] 
hard work.”58  ASCAP also issued a statement speaking specifically to the new 
media rights withdrawal issue determined in In re Pandora, including a 
statement by ASCAP’s CEO John LoFrumento, who opined: 
ASCAP’s more than 470,000 songwriter, composer[,] and music publisher 
members make their living creating the music without which Pandora would 
                                                            
 53  Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. (citing United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681–82 (1971)). 
57 See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
58 Jonathan Stempel & Sakthi Prasad, Internet Radio Service Pandora Prevails In License 
Dispute: In re Petition of Pandora, WESTLAW J. COMPUTER & INTERNET (Thomson Reuters, 
Wayne, Pa.), Oct. 3, 2013, at 11. 
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have no business.  The [c]ourt’s decision to grant summary judgment on this 
matter has no impact on our fundamental position in this case . . . .  ASCAP 
looks forward to the December 4th trial, where ASCAP will demonstrate the true 
value of songwriters’ and composers’ performance rights, a value that Pandora’s 
music streaming competitors have recognized by negotiating rather than 
litigating with creators of music.59 
 Pandora and the courts have seen further mass licensing contractual 
action that speaks to the future of the In re Pandora decision, as well as new 
media licensing generally, in the form of Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Pandora 
Media, Inc.60 In this more recent decision, Judge Stanton of the Southern District 
of New York used many of the same terms and familiar language from the In re 
Pandora decision decided in the same district, and the basis of the case 
indubitably factually resembled In re Pandora very closely.61  However, a 
different and significant conclusion was reached in BMI.  So significant is the 
result in this case, as well as In re Pandora, that media sources affiliated more 
with the reporting of music news rather than legal developments have taken 
notice, including Spin magazine, which offered this concise remark on the BMI 
ruling: 
[A] federal judge honored Pandora’s request for a court order against such 
practices, ruling that the original deal with ASCAP superseded all attempts to 
secure more favorable rates — essentially, that every artist’s catalog is worth the 
same, be they unheard of or famous.62  But[,] Pandora also went up against [] 
another massive music publishing umbrella: Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).  
And[,] in a decision filed on Thursday, December 19, [2013,] Pandora lost. 
The issues were exactly the same, as seen in court documents obtained by 
[Spin].  Certain publishers within BMI wanted to get more money for their 
music, and the radio provider wanted to quash that.  But[,] this judge shot 
Pandora down, citing contractual details between BMI and the people in its 
stable.  While ASCAP’s agreement with its publishers [did not] allow for 
withdrawal, it turns out BMI’s [did] — seemingly with [that] exact scenario in 
mind.63 
                                                            
59 Update On New Media Rights Withdrawal, ASCAP (last visited Nov. 24, 2013), 
http://www.ascap.com/members/governingdocuments/rights-withdrawal.aspx. 
 60  2013 WL 6697788, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013). 
61 While the exact nature and history of Broadcast Music, Incorporated (BMI) is rich enough for 
its own discussion, the similarities between it and ASCAP are immense: both are licensing industries 
for composers and performers; both deal in mass licenses that allow the licensee to offer public or 
other performance of the media contained in their catalogue; and both have substantial history, 
originating in the early parts of the twentieth century and growing exponentially from there.  See 
About, BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., http://www.bmi.com/about (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
62 Referencing In re Pandora.  See supra text accompanying note 18. 
63 Chris Martins, Pandora Loses Case Against BMI, Will Have to Pay More for Music, SPIN 
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The remarks by Spin magazine effectively summarize the result of this 
case, but the judge’s precise language is worth examining further.  Both 
decisions break down the history and context of the mass license ability granted 
to and used by the organizations through similar antitrust history.64  Notably, 
Judge Stanton emphasized that, while the nature of the mass license issued by 
BMI and held by Pandora is undisputed, he took a different perspective on the 
grant, or withholding, of the “new media” rights so important to companies such 
as Pandora.65  The difference between the cases first becomes apparent in light 
of the initial question, which was presented similarly in both cases.  The inquiry 
raised the issue of whether a withdrawal of the new media rights by certain 
publishers or rights holders from the collective licensing agencies—ASCAP or, 
in this case, BMI—affects the antitrust-created blanket license granted to 
Pandora immediately, or if the selfsame antitrust created blanket license permits 
Pandora to continue to broadcast the entire library as of the date of the last 
issuance.66 
Judge Stanton held that the answer to that question, unlike the finding in 
In re Pandora, is that once the rights holders remove the license from their 
individual bodies of work from BMI, those works are immediately no longer 
part of the “repertory” as it was licensed to Pandora, and copyright common law 
and case precedent prevents BMI from offering the same blanket license that 
would include the new media rights from that moment forward.  In the words of 
Judge Stanton himself: 
[T]he BMI [c]onsent [d]ecree requires BMI to offer Pandora a license to perform 
all of the compositions in its repertory.  When BMI no longer is authorized by 
music publisher copyright holders to license their compositions to Pandora and 
[n]ew [m]edia [s]ervices, those compositions are no longer eligible for inclusion 
in BMI’s repertory.  BMI can no longer license them to Pandora or any other 
applicant.67 
Insomuch as the facts of the cases are nearly identical, a more in-depth 
examination of how the judges differed as to the immediate effect of the rights 
                                                            
(Dec. 19, 2013, 8:03 PM), http://www.spin.com/articles/pandora-bmi-court-licensing-publishing-
artists/. 
64 BMI’s ability to license the public performance rights of its musical repertory is  
governed by the [c]onsent [d]ecree settling this antitrust suit brought by the United 
States.  An amendment to the BMI [c]onsent [d]ecree establishes this [c]ourt as a “rate 
court,” which sets fees for licenses when BMI and applicants cannot agree on a 
reasonable fee.  BMI Consent Decree Art. XIII.  The [d]ecree also imposes certain 
conditions and requirements on BMI’s issuance of licenses. 
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 6697788, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013). 
65 Id. at *3–4. 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 27, 29. 
 67  Broadcast Music, Inc., 2013 WL 6697788, at *1. 
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holders electing to remove their new media rights from Pandora is crucial not 
only from the perspective of understanding the case itself, but also the broader 
question that this Note has already attempted to pose regarding the future of new 
media and the ASCAP/BMI style of licensure. 
Just as ASCAP must operate under the pre-established regulations of 
antitrust rulings, BMI too must abide by similar restrictions—referred to as the 
BMI consent decree—when licensing public performance rights of the property 
of its members.68  The opinion cited specific portions of BMI’s consent decree 
in support of its argument: that the decree supported the nullification of the 
agreed-upon terms when the consent decree was issued, if the terms changed in 
the form of the withdrawal of the new media rights.69  In pertinent part, Judge 
Stanton held that: 
Under Section XIV of the BMI [c]onsent [d]ecree, when an applicant requests a 
license for “any, some[,] or all of the compositions in defendant’s repertory,” 
BMI must grant a license for performance of the requested compositions . . . . By 
placing a composition in the BMI repertory, the affiliate routinely authorizes its 
inclusion in blanket licenses of BMI’s whole repertory to all applicants. 
But[,] if the withdrawal of its authority to do so by some affiliates with respect 
to compositions for which they own or administer the copyrights is within those 
affiliates’ rights, BMI cannot offer [n]ew [m]edia licensing rights for those 
compositions to [n]ew [m]edia applicants, including Pandora.  If BMI cannot 
offer those compositions to [n]ew [m]edia applicants, their availability does not 
meet the standards of the BMI [c]onsent [d]ecree, and they cannot be held in 
BMI’s repertory.  [Because] they are not in BMI’s repertory, BMI cannot deal in 
or license those compositions to anyone.70 
As presumed in this portion of the ruling, the court predicated its findings 
on a singular reading of the term “repertory,” and more specifically a reading of 
the works within that repertory as either a singular inseparable unit or 
alternatively something more akin to the “bundle of rights” analogy—a bundle 
                                                            
68 BMI’s ability to license the public performance rights of its musical repertory is 
governed by the [c]onsent [d]ecree settling this antitrust suit brought by the United 
States.  An amendment to the BMI [c]onsent [d]ecree establishes this [c]ourt as a “rate 
court,” which sets fees for licenses when BMI and applicants cannot agree on a 
reasonable fee. 
Broad. Music, Inc., 2013 WL 6697788, at *1.  Though it is not the same set of rulings and 
regulations, illuminative to understanding the BMI consent decree are the notes and commentary 
within this Note referencing the already-discussed ASCAP antitrust regulation scheme and the most 
recent iteration thereof known as AFJ2.  See Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 196–
97.  See generally Blum, supra note 8. 
69 Broad. Music, Inc., 2013 WL 6697788, at *1–2. 
70 Id. at *3–4. 
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of which new media performance is one of the rights.71  The In re Pandora 
decision contains language already referenced that quite clearly finds within the 
bounds of that opinion and antitrust rulings relating to ASCAP that the “works” 
there disputed were made up of “musical compositions and not rights with 
respect to those compositions.”72  For emphasis in this different reading, 
compare the following two passages referencing the nature of the licensure 
understanding: first, from the language of In re Pandora: 
In ordinary usage[,] the word “work” in the musical context means a 
composition and not a right in a composition . . . . The term “works” in AFJ2 has 
its origin in [c]opyright law, and it is clear from [c]opyright caselaw that works 
means “compositions” in that context.  And[,] “where contracting parties use 
terms and concepts that are firmly rooted in federal law, and where there are no 
explicit signals to the contrary, we can presume that the prevailing federal 
definition controls.”73 
and, second, to the comparable language in the BMI decision: 
It is the BMI [c]onsent [d]ecree (and the antitrust law) which restrict BMI from 
carrying in its repertory compositions which it can no longer offer to the [n]ew 
[m]edia [s]ervices, who were up until recently accepted as legitimate, qualified, 
licensed[,] and performing those works.  BMI’s repertory consists of 
compositions whose performance BMI “has the right to license or sublicense”; it 
“shall upon the request of any unlicensed broadcaster, license the rights publicly 
to perform its repertory.”  BMI Consent Decree Arts. II(C); VII(B).  When 
portions of that right are withdrawn, the affected compositions are no longer 
eligible for membership in BMI’s repertory, and it cannot include them in a 
blanket license or license them at all.74 
When taken in light of the above, the court’s finding contains the 
presumption that the consent decree issued for antitrust purposes against BMI 
contains in its language terms that indicate the rights within a single work may 
indeed be separated, though presumably without the effect of such language 
from the consent decree, the common law and copyright law discussed by the 
court in In re Pandora would otherwise govern.75  The reading of the term 
                                                            
71 Id. 
72 In re Pandora Media, Inc., 2013 WL 5211927, at *6. 
73 Id. 
74 Broad. Music, Inc., 2013 WL 6697788, at *4. 
75 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  Copyright law as it would apply to the specific 
intersection with antitrust law as applied throughout decades past to ASCAP as well as BMI is a 
robust body of law to say the least, and a full explanation or examination thereof is substantially 
beyond the scope of this Note.  However, even from the directly cited portions of the ASCAP 
decision, it is apparent that differing views of what are in essence virtually identical licensing are at 
play, and the “winning” view from between the two might have substantially differing, and yet 
crucial, impacts on the future of new media for Pandora and others in the future. 
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“works” and the potential for rights contained within them seen in the BMI case 
is particularly surprising given that the ASCAP decision, which again went to bat 
with facts appreciably similar in every regard save the specific antitrust ruling 
that applied, was not indirect when it came to digging deep for the legal 
justification for its view, even far beyond the language of the AFJ2 antitrust 
ruling that binds ASCAP: 
Section 102 of the Copyright Act refers to “works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”  This . . . is inconsistent with a reading of works that defines 
the word in terms of “rights.”  And[,] the Supreme Court has referred to a 
“work” as the “translat[ion][of] an idea into a fixed, tangible expression.”  
Compositions, but not rights in compositions, are able to be “fixed” in “tangible 
medium[s] of expression.” 
. . . . 
Because “works” in AFJ2 means “composition[s]” and not “rights in 
compositions”, and because it is undisputed that the terms of ASCAP’s 
[c]ompendium [m]odification of April 2011 permit ASCAP to retain the right to 
license the works of the withdrawing publishers for non-[n]ew [m]edia purposes, 
those compositions remain “works in the ASCAP repertory” . . . . In fact, 
ASCAP retains the right under the “Standard Services” agreement to license the 
works of withdrawing publishers even to certain smaller [n]ew [m]edia 
licensees.  Thus, the works remain in every facet of the ASCAP repertory.76 
While a nuanced view of the differences in language from the AFJ2 ruling 
to the BMI consent decree is hardly surprising, from the perspective of new 
media companies including Pandora, it might appear more than a bit troubling 
that a court would be willing to ignore the larger tenants of copyright law and 
Supreme Court precedent included in the ASCAP In re Pandora decision in 
favor of the rather blunt analysis seen in BMI that at least appears to throw more 
fuel upon the fire of an already-convoluted area of law.  In the long run, such an 
unwillingness to truly dig deep and reexamine the precedent and foundation of 
both the antitrust regulations and all the attached trappings, such as calculation 
of reasonable fees, seems to be the less beneficial choice all around from both a 
clarity of law perspective, as well as an economic perspective from enterprises 
such as Pandora who might stand to gain from forcing a “shakedown” of both 
ASCAP as well as BMI’s interests and the law that surrounds them.  
Specifically, a result that might be called such a shakedown could be argued to 
catalyze more effective compensation for and presentation of new media 
                                                            
76 In re Pandora, 2013 WL 5211927, at *6–7 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
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through avenues such as Internet streaming in the twenty-first century.77 
Hearkening back for a moment to the historical examination of the 
tensions between market forces and the perceived necessity for an institution 
such as ASCAP, this stretch of logic by the court might indeed to some be the 
“straw that broke the camel’s back” in terms of once again rendering untenable 
the balancing act between static antitrust law that prevents shady dealings 
between different licensees, and, on the other side, the market forces and 
dynamic influence of new technologies and outlets.78  Those new technologies 
and outlets certainly can be said to be as broad as the Internet and new media 
streaming—indeed, anything in the general field that serves to not call into 
question the merits of relying upon radio-based decrees for fair dealings. 
V.  ARGUMENT: THE CURRENT AFTERMATH AND APPLICATION OF IN RE 
PANDORA AND RELATED JURISPRUDENCE, DECREES, AND LAW RESULTS IN AN 
UNTENABLE RESTRICTION ON THE MARKET INFLUENCES OF THE INTERNET AND 
“NEW MEDIA” SUCH AS PANDORA. 
After examining the judicial history and different interests that intersect 
where the problems and tensions highlighted by these cases end up, it seems 
readily apparent that the current arrangement among artists and the groups, such 
as ASCAP and BMI, is far from ideal.  Pandora, along with other similarly 
situated businesses, finds itself in the middle of appreciating certain terms of the 
antitrust regime—which itself might be argued to be out of place—yet also 
potentially benefitting rather immensely from a new system shaped by the forces 
of the market—if the antitrust arrangement were ever pulled away to allow such 
a reshaping. 
Notably, however, the interests of Pandora and its peers as described in 
                                                            
77 This argument is effectively echoed in many other discussions of the intersection of the 
Internet’s diverse services and avenues for media delivery, and the more antiquated laws that are 
applied to those avenues.  See also supra notes 17 and 18. 
78 While the Author does not attempt to disguise the stance that the current system upheld and 
discussed by the courts cannot and should not be continued in its current form, it is worth taking a 
step back before launching into a verbose argument for change and recognizing that calling for new 
policy in place of current policy that might be less than ideal is far easier than exactly contemplating 
such policy.  The argument presented in this Note will, of course, attempt to be precise in describing 
how the artists’ hard work might still be duly compensated through whatever system serves to best 
take the place of the current regime.  In sum, Syracuse Law author Blaine Bassett concisely 
describes the tension of analysis in this area: “It is easy to make predictions, to paint pictures of a 
rosy future.  It is easy to say what the law should do.  But, of course, the rule of law demands that 
courts do much more than make sheer policy judgments.  Even if it is good policy for the courts to 
shake things up and plunge the industry deeper into the revolution, the question remains as to how 
such judgments can legitimately be made.  This question is clearly a more difficult one.”  Blaine 
Bassett, The Inevitable Television Revolution: The Technology Is Ready, the Business Is Lagging, 
and the Law Can Help, 29 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 46 (2013) (emphasis omitted). 
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this way is not the only perspective causing onlookers to cry out that something 
new is overdue.  Even those working in and around the music industry—the 
stalwarts of the classic negotiation table and record deal—are asking that the 
courts or someone allow for a new way of doing things with the Internet and 
new streaming media.  Some of the strongest words recently uttered about the 
arrangement came from the mouth of Martin N. Bandier, the chairman of 
behemoth music publisher Sony/ATV, referring to the larger arrangement of 
ASCAP, BMI, and the way that licensing fees and royalties are split: “It’s a 
godawful [sic] system that just [does not] work.”79  His frustration, as the article 
aptly frames, stems from the same outdated tug-of-war view of the current 
arrangement that many, including this Note, have likened to the courts or system 
at large attempting to use old systems and practices to fit an obviously new and 
different model, no matter the cost.  As the same New York Times article 
describes, “As the music industry races toward a future of digital streams and 
smartphone apps, its latest crisis centers on a regulatory plan that has been in 
place since ‘Chattanooga Choo Choo’ was a hit.”80  More specifically, the article 
frames well the same historical context that this Note examined in part and how 
such a context leads to potential special interests that do not reflect the current 
reality of the market forces and demand: 
This system has hummed along for decades.  But[,] with the rise of Internet 
radio, publishers have complained that the rules are antiquated and unfair.  They 
point to the disparity in the way Pandora compensates the two sides of the music 
business: Last year, Pandora paid 49% of its revenue, or about $313 million, to 
record companies[] but only 4[%], or about $26 million, to publishers.81 
Even with such vitriolic commentary on the state of the current system, 
however, the potentially contemplated replacements for the current system find 
themselves in the realm of the theoretical more than a practical policy or exact 
ruling suggestion.82  Of course, many would focus on the one constant among 
                                                            
79 Ben Sisaro, Pandora Suit May Upend Century-Old Royalty Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2014, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/14/business/media/pandora-suit-may-upend-century-
old-royalty-plan.html?_r=0. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Of course, as raised earlier in this Note, the unfocused desire on behalf of the record 
companies to force direct negotiation, thereby allowing for both the likes of Pandora and the 
publishers to determine what fee or royalty arrangement is enough outside of the bounds or 
protection of the antitrust consent decrees, is the very action that prompted the In re Pandora 
litigation.  From the New York Times commentary: 
Music executives argue that the problem is rooted in the Justice Department’s 
oversight of [ASCAP] and BMI.  Under the consent decrees, the performing 
rights groups are not permitted to reuse licenses to any outlet that applies for 
them, and rate negotiations can drag on for years.  To get around this, some 
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those arguments and litigation-prompting actions, which is the desire for those 
parties who feel slighted to simply engage in old-fashioned bargaining table 
negotiation with the likes of Pandora, with the music that the consumer 
eventually expects to hear through their computers and smartphones as the 
bargaining chip.  Indeed, few might disagree with the sort of pure free-enterprise 
picture such an alternative paints, but, obviously, there are other concerns.83  As 
for ASCAP’s own perspective on the current situation, some insight is offered 
into the way that the organization perceives Pandora’s actions from a recent 
interview that Billboard magazine conducted with ASCAP Nashville 
membership co-heads Michael Martin and LeAnn Phelan: 
[Interviewer]: The problem is basically that if you go to the store and buy a 
carrot, [it is] physical, it came from some place, [you are] gonna [sic] pay for 
that.  When you bought a record years ago, you could hang on to the record and 
you understood that it came from someplace and [you are] paying for it.  But[,] 
now we only hang on to the device.  We no longer hang on to the original song. 
[LeAnn Phelan]: Yeah, the song is just this magical thing.  But[,] the difference 
would be like this: If I wanted to buy a carrot and you were selling the carrot and 
you said this carrot is worth [ten] cents, and I say, “I [do not] really want to pay 
that, let’s go to court and figure out how much the carrot is worth,” I still get to 
take the carrot home and eat it while [we are] figuring out the price of it.  
Pandora and all these people, they still get to use music even though the price is 
[being contested]. 
[Michael Martin]: And [we have] been a part of some of these careers when no 
one knew them.  And[,] they were still getting paid an advance.  Nobody thinks 
about that.  How do you factor that in?84 
While one perspective on ASCAP’s interest in this is of course the one 
projected by the organization itself—the noble cause of protecting the individual 
composer or artist—some other outside observers to the situation feel less 
                                                            
big publishers have tried to change their ties with [ASCAP] and BMI, forcing 
digital outlets like Pandora to negotiate directly.  Pandora cried foul in its 
federal lawsuit . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
83 The antitrust determination and discussion of ASCAP and its peers, outdated as some are 
obviously beginning to see it, nonetheless occupies space in a sort of “rarified air” of those services 
that are almost etched in stone as the “necessary evil” that should not be provided by the 
government, and yet cannot exist in the private sector without this sort of heavy-handed oversight to 
maintain status quo.  In a largely unrelated, recently certiorari-granted Supreme Court case regarding 
the Aereo streaming media service, the lower court mentioned ASCAP and BMI in this exact context 
and conclusion.  See Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
84 Tom Roland, ‘The Ellis Island of Music Row’: ASCAP Nashville’s Michael Martin and LeAnn 
Phelan on 100 Years (Q&A), BILLBOARD (Feb. 11, 2014, 4:28 PM), http://www.billboard. 
com/biz/articles/news/legal-and-management/5901228/the-ellis-island-of-music-row-ascap-
nashvilles. 
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generously about ASCAP’s position under the current scheme and their actions 
against Pandora.  For example, Mike Masnick, writing on behalf of Techdirt, 
takes a less than charitable view of ASCAP’s true interests under its regulatory 
umbrella and directly accuses it of collusion behind its consent decree shield: 
[During] the last few years, [we have] been covering the incredible and bizarre 
legal fight between ASCAP and Pandora, which has seen ASCAP stoop to 
amazing lows.  You can read some of the basic background in some of our 
previous posts.  A key part of this was that the major labels, key members of 
ASCAP, suddenly started “dropping out” of ASCAP in order to do licensing 
directly.  At first we thought this was a sign of how the labels might be realizing 
that ASCAP was obsolete and out of touch, but it has since become clear that 
these “removals” were all something of a scam to force Pandora into higher 
rates.  
What happened was that ASCAP and Pandora had first negotiated a higher rate 
than Pandora had agreed to in the past—reaching a handshake agreement.  
However, before that agreement could be finalized, these labels started 
“withdrawing” from ASCAP in order to negotiate directly. . . [w]ith its back to 
the wall, Pandora was forced to agree to much, much higher rates with those 
labels who had “withdrawn” their songs—and then those labels magically put 
their songs back in ASCAP. . . and then ASCAP claimed that those newly 
“negotiated” deals represented “true market” deals, and argued that in an open 
market, it deserved those kinds of crazy high royalty rates.  Pandora pointed out 
that this pretty clearly violated the antitrust decree against ASCAP—an 
argument that Pandora won in the first round. 
. . . [T]he “withdrawals” were never actually about the labels withdrawing their 
music from ASCAP, but what certainly looks like collusion [].85 
The question as phrased by the ASCAP executive’s response—how to 
“factor . . . in”86 the value of the intellectual property by any other means if not 
the present arrangement—is indeed the same question being asked by all sides 
but, perhaps, with different contemplated answers.  In that sense, the true 
motivations of ASCAP, BMI, and other similarly-situated players are not 
necessarily germane to the context of this Note—even if their righteous anger is 
instead, as argued by some, simple cronyism and collusion.87  So, what then is 
                                                            
85 Mike Masnick, Surprise: ASCAP and Music Labels Colluded To Screw Pandora, TECHDIRT 
(Feb. 12, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140209/01061226149/details-come-
out-about-how-ascap-colluded-with-labels-to-screw-pandora.shtml. 
86 Roland, supra note 80. 
87 Despite the reduced relevance of its motivations, the case made for the depth of the self-
interest in the actions taken by ASCAP leading to the In re Pandora litigation is presented pretty 
compellingly by Mike Masnick in the previously-referenced Techdirt commentary.  The author 
points out not only the surface-level facts that might be perceived in a way that results in conclusory 
cries of collusion and corruption, but also includes some rather suspect and volatile remarks to that 
effect from the deposition taken in the In re Pandora case from ASCAP president Paul Williams:  
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the next step?  How might the courts, the industry, or the artist arrive at the exact 
value of these digital “carrots?” 
The first solution that this Note will posit is one that can be most aptly 
categorized under the language of author Blaine Basset of the Syracuse Journal 
of Science & Technology: “the shake-up” solution.88  Speaking in the context of 
television and the tribulations similar to the Pandora streaming media issues that 
it has suffered when clashing with the new era of the Internet, Basset states: 
A revolution is happening in the . . . industry.  It is ongoing—it has been 
building for years as technology has advanced and consumer demand has 
evolved, and it will continue to build for years to come.  At the end of the 
revolution, [it] will hardly be recognizable as the institution it once was.  The 
assumptions upon which it was built . . . are crumbling and will continue to 
crumble until they are another relic of the industry like the cathode ray tube.  As 
technology continues to advance and old business models continue to 
deteriorate, the law should encourage experimentation in the industry.  This may 
be done simply by declining to protect business models that no longer work—
despite the money and power behind those models.  Declining such protection 
will serve to “shake up” the industry in a way that will encourage 
experimentation, hard trade-offs, and innovation.89 
Though here the author is discussing the television and broadcast industry, 
instead of the radio and streaming media areas at play, the solution and tone are 
very applicable.  Just as Bassett points out that regardless of the ultimate 
solution in terms of regulation or judicial (in)action, the first step must be 
“shaking up” the current system by no longer relying upon the schemes that 
                                                            
[Potential collusion]  [be]comes clear in Paul Williams’ deposition.  Given 
that all these major labels were apparently “withdrawing” all of their digital 
rights, you might think (1) that ASCAP would be upset since it was losing all 
its key labels and (2) that Williams might look at reducing the cost of his 
licenses, [because] apparently they would no longer have all these important 
songs.  Not so.  From the trial transcript, [here is] Pandora’s lawyer explaining 
how Williams responded when they asked him about it at his deposition: 
‘Did you ever consider that ASCAP could charge a lower price and try 
to get more people to use the works left in ASCAP rather than have 
users use the higher priced EMI repertoire?’ 
‘Answer: Never once did that occur to me.’ 
   In other words, it was all about raising the rates. It was not about competition. 
On top of that, it details how, even as these labels were “withdrawing,” representatives from those 
very same labels/publishers still sat on ASCAP’s board . . . more evidence has come out during the 
case, showing that this was all part of the plan between the labels and ASCAP. 
Masnick, supra note 81. 
 88 Blaine Bassett, The Inevitable Television Revolution: The Technology Is Ready, the Business Is 
Lagging, and the Law Can Help, 29 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1 (2013). 
89 Id. at 49–50. 
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“protect business models that no longer work.”90  While in the exact context of 
Bassett’s commentary this model was the television broadcast and advertising 
model, the reasoning can easily and timely be applied to the issues of the 
consent decrees at play in ASCAP and BMI’s protected role in the streaming 
and terrestrial radio model.91 
After moving past the separate consideration of what ASCAP’s true 
motivations might have been for their role in the instant dispute and, for that 
matter, the comparable motivations of Pandora in its actions, the question is to 
ask what the best immediate action might be to instigate that “shaking up” of the 
current model and allow market or other forces to shape some solution that 
better matches the rapidly shifting world of the Internet and the new media 
delivery systems that fill it. 
In terms of what those first steps might resemble, the good news is that 
there is some certain amount of common ground, as well as economic and other 
tautologies, that might be used effectively to the ultimate end.  Writing in the 
San Francisco Classical Voice, authors Stephanie Jones and Michael Zwiebach 
discuss the bigger-picture implications of the Pandora issue.  This discussion 
includes their vision of this future, centering primarily on the idea that economic 
and exposure appeal to artists and musicians is unchanging and will remain 
despite economic squabbles, ensuring that the model finds some eventual outlet 
for monetization of the same.  Michael Aczon, an entertainment lawyer and 
educator interviewed in the article, pointed out that “[t]he issue of fair 
compensation is part of the teething troubles of Internet radio,” but, despite 
those obvious troubles, “[s]omehow the tech industry, the finance industry, and 
the music industry have to work cooperatively . . . and [there is] going to be a 
business model that will reward [creators].”92  The article expands on Aczon’s 
comments by illustrating how the appeal and constant presence of the Internet 
and new outlets for users and sales cannot be ignored by regulators and labels 
alike, even if they find themselves at odds with the current version: 
The good news is that Pandora, which has shown no interest in expanding its 
core product, does actually need people to create the music.  It probably [will 
not] settle on a model that discourages musicians over the long haul.  The 
service still thinks of itself as a gateway for musicians who will have a better 
                                                            
90 Id. 
91 The precise parallel or equivalent to the outdated model that Bassett references in his 
discussion about the television industry might not simply be the existence of the consent decrees and 
antitrust regulation, or protection, afforded ASCAP and BMI, but even more exactly the calculations 
and models used by the court from those decrees to fix and determine what is “fair” compensation 
among the mass licenses granted.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
92 Stephanie Jones & Michael Zwiebach, The Pandora Problem: Royalty, Streamed or Short-
Changed, SAN FRANCISCO CLASSICAL VOICE, https://www.sfcv.org/article/the-pandora-problem-
royalty-streamed-or-short-changed (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
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future because of the Internet.  There is some research beginning to emerge that 
supports the idea that active Internet music users actually also are the music 
industry’s best customers. 
Internet streaming is a way to broaden the base: More songs being played, 
means more musicians being paid.93 
While admittedly the above commentary and observations about the 
industry at large do little to offer a precise regulatory scheme or workable 
changes to the current arrangement and all the “moving parts” of the antitrust 
considerations, Pandora’s actions, and the necessity of organizations like 
ASCAP and BMI to protect composers and artists’ interests in this day and age, 
do highlight how the log jam that currently exists would find new common 
ground if even a small step were taken to allow for the “shaking-up process” to 
begin. 
Some more specific propositions as to altering the current regulatory 
scheme in the broader sense of the copyright law at play have been proposed.  
One such option is raised effectively by author Peter DiCola in his Boston Law 
Review article addressing the option of shifting towards a “copyright equality” 
motivation in distribution and treatment of royalties and obligations.94  While 
the specific proposals included in this option do not necessarily address or 
change the antitrust considerations that motivate the continued oversight of 
ASCAP from the government side, the discussion still includes some options 
and views of the Internet as a medium that might serve as an instrument for 
allowing subsequent actions against or involving the antitrust questions and even 
the larger question of the continued necessity of organizations like ASCAP in 
their current form.95 
DiCola summarized the form of this doctrine in his concise summary: 
The rise of new methods of distribution in the absence of a coherent regulatory 
scheme across music distribution technologies has produced discrimination and 
inefficiency.  Policymakers should recognize that copyright is just as much 
concerned with communications regulation as it is with the provision of 
incentives for creation . . . . This ends up affecting not only how people listen to 
music[] but also what music reaches them, given the vast differences in the 
                                                            
93 Id. 
94 Peter DiCola, Copyright Equality: Free Speech, Efficiency, and Regulatory Parity in 
Distribution, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1837, 1902 (2013). 
95 Even those very close to other stalwart organizations working in the music industry are 
beginning to question the continued necessity of keeping around the likes of ASCAP and BMI in 
their current regulatory form.  Rick Carnes, a songwriter and president of the Songwriters Guild of 
America, had the following to say regarding the organizations in the previously-cited New York 
Times article: “[The current position of ASCAP and BMI] is a horse-and-buggy consent decree in a 
digital environment.  [There is] no way that works now.”  See Sisaro, supra note 75. 
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catalogs of songs that different media play. . . . The lack of regulatory parity can 
be remedied in part by requiring traditional radio stations to pay royalties to 
sound recording copyright owners.96 
While DiCola discussed a specific portion of copyright law that does not 
apply in full to the more specific antitrust and negation/market collision at play 
in the instant dispute, the reasoning, as well as the predicating facts, presents a 
workable comparison for the purposes of this argument.  DiCola showed how 
the current disparity in the treatment of new media and older formats can be 
eliminated by “pulling” the treatment of the older mediums up to the same level 
desired for new media, and, though some other more precise doctrines of 
copyright law are invoked in his argument, the premise still supports the 
conclusion that allowing more consistency and openness in the intersection of 
the market and a regulatory scheme benefits all parties involved.97 
Another way of examining how DiCola’s argument can be conceptualized 
to apply to the problem of antitrust, consent decrees, and streaming new media 
is to consider the very specific problem of the consent decrees and the 
calculation of fair pricing discussed earlier in this Note.98  Atop the already-
precarious perch of the consent decree and latest version of the antitrust 
enforcement, the Internet calculations for radio as applied to new media are 
arguably being pulled backwards in time based on this nearly century-old 
scheme for valuation and calculation.  Again, while this consideration—and to 
some extent DiCola’s argument as it may conceivably be applied to the In re 
Pandora problem as a potential soluble scheme—does not perhaps provide so 
broad an answer as to settle regulatory concerns that would “require” that the 
presence of ASCAP, BMI, and their equivalents remain in the private sector 
strung up with the strings of antitrust rulings and enforcement, attempting to 
“shake-up” at least the way that performance and other rights are calculated and 
negotiated in new media and online streaming radio seems to be the most 
attractive option for all sides. 
Again, this Note does not presume to be so broad in its consideration as to 
truly approach the question of necessity for antitrust enforcement against the 
likes of ASCAP and BMI—many other learned sources have opined as to the 
economic effects and necessary calculations generally necessary in response to 
new industries and challenges in that area of law.99  Instead, the hope of the 
                                                            
96 See DiCola, supra note 94, at 1902–03. 
97 “The question of default versus mandatory rules raises the issue of direct payment.  A major 
advantage of bringing traditional radio and on-demand streaming into the § 114 statutory licensing 
scheme is that the scheme provides for direct payment to artists.”  Id. at 1900. 
98 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
99  
Reliance on economic evidence has proved troublesome in antitrust analysis . . . the 
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Author is simply to have drawn attention and focus through the emerging 
dispute—arguably, stalemate—epitomized by In re Pandora between the 
current legal and judicial enforcement and regulation interests, and technology 
and emerging new media markets.   
To summarize and emphasize this point: It is fair to say that any potential 
“shake-up” would likely benefit the industry and consumer.  Furthermore, it 
might catalyze the world of legal discussion and prediction as well by prompting 
questions such as the relevance of antitrust law to this area contrasted against 
market forces, demand, and the ability to negotiate and pay for intellectual 
property in manner resulting in a neat and profitable model that still ultimately 
benefits the consumer.  As In re Pandora and the rapidly-growing body of 
discussion surrounding it have shown, the best starting place to do that is to 
reconcile the different interests and nature of “new media” and web radio with 
the current, arguably outdated or nonresponsive regime.100 
This Note has thus far referenced the alleged and demonstrated interests of 
those participating in enforcement, the companies such as Pandora, 
commentators, and labels in actualizing some sort of reform.  Another insight 
from an artist, however, seems an apropos way to underscore the final notes of 
the discussion.  Songwriter and musician Burt Bacharach shared his feelings on 
this topic in a Wall Street Journal editorial, stating clearly that he feels that 
online and mobile services such as Pandora offer immense and exciting 
                                                            
influx of economic theory in mergers analysis has unduly complicated the process 
and, at times, led to counterintuitive results . . . perhaps most important[ly], lower 
courts are using economic theory to fill the gaps in the evidentiary record, and, at 
times, are accepting as true theoretical propositions that are contrary to the actual 
proof in a given case.   
Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitrust Law and Economic Theory: Finding A Balance, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
123, 148–49 (2013). 
Commenters and witnesses largely agree that antitrust analysis has sufficient 
grounding in sound economic analysis, openness to new economic learning, and 
flexibility to enable the courts and the antitrust agencies properly to assess 
competitive issues in new economy industries.  Most importantly, commenters noted, 
the economic principles on which antitrust is based do not require revision for 
application to those industries.  As one economist noted, basic economic principles do 
not become “outdated” simply because industries become highly dynamic. 
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, LAW AND THE NEW ECONOMY, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, 31 (Apr. 2, 2007) available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_ 
recommendation/chapter1.pdf. 
100 Practically, this sort of reform or reexamination might take shape in terms of insight or 
discussion regarding the dollar amounts and measurable effects on the artists themselves—“the buck 
stops here” sort of discussion.  As referenced earlier in this Note, some commentators have already 
been speaking out in these terms in the context of artists’ and labels’ desire to continue participating 
in new media and web radio but with dissatisfaction with how the current regulatory scheme works 
for them.  See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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possibilities for artists such as himself, but that the current scheme is simply 
untenable.101  Specifically, Mr. Bacharach cries foul as to the interaction 
between the regulatory scheme and ASCAP/BMI, not the businesses or their 
practices: 
Today, many songwriters are being denied fair compensation as a result of 
antiquated regulations that were conceived over [seventy] years ago for a 
different world.  Songwriters are especially disadvantaged because we are 
governed by outdated settlements between the Justice Department and . . . 
[ASCAP], and . . . BMI. 
As music embraces the digital transition, it seems obvious that the anachronistic 
way songwriters and composers are remunerated should evolve, too.  This is 
especially necessary in the wake of recent court interpretations of the consent 
decrees that perpetuate the devaluation of our work. 
As songwriters, we want these new digital services to succeed.  But[,] . . . I am 
not sure a young writer can survive in the online and mobile world restrained by 
a compensation regime that [could not] fathom “streams” that come from 
“clouds.”  We live in a free-market economy and should be able to negotiate 
rates that sustain a marketplace where both services and creators can thrive.102 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
What sort of further legal action and future awaits Pandora or other similar 
streaming media companies remains to be seen.  Certainly other cases will 
inevitably rise to the surface, pitting the interests of companies using the Internet 
and new means of raising money through works of artists against the companies 
that represent those artists.  And, given the outcome of the cases and decisions 
discussed within this Note, it would appear that the likely players will continue 
to include ASCAP and BMI, among others serving similar roles.  Still, as the 
very complexities that caused those two organizations to sit up and take notice 
of companies like Pandora in the first place tend to show, as the Internet and the 
media channels found within it continue to change and evolve at a high rate, it 
seems as if it will become increasingly difficult for the courts to continue to 
hand down the same rulings again and again with slight modifications that 
dictate the way in which those companies must pay for permission to sell 
performances of music and other properties. 
However, one thing can be said for certain, and that is, while perhaps the 
duel between the camps of ASCAP and BMI and companies such as Pandora 
might be a roadblock on the road of media distribution progress, the winner 
                                                            
101 Burt Bacharach, What the Songwriting World Needs Now, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304603704579325053186123012. 
102 Id. 
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continues to be the consumer.  High-quality music is easier than ever to obtain 
through online channels and even for free on websites such as YouTube for the 
low price of enduring an advertisement.  While the “tubes”103 of the Internet 
might perhaps be loosened or straightened to allow for more accurate and 
precise—but fair—payment to the artists, and without loosening the reigns of 
antitrust interest, the age in which we live still is a delight for media and music 
consumers of all types, and for the artists and rights-holders as well. 
                                                            
103 The titular reference of this Note to the Internet as “tubes” references a once infamous 
incident involving political discourse and the Internet that rapidly spread through the same online 
avenues it was referencing and became equal parts joke and Internet fad.  The specific nomenclature 
in question originates from a distinctive analogy made by then Alaska Senator Ted Stevens 
discussing the cons of net neutrality legislation, during which he likened the Internet not only to a 
“series of tubes,” but also clarified that the Internet is not “like a big truck.”  Alex Curtis, Senator 
Stevens Speaks on Net Neutrality, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Jun. 28, 2006), https://www.public 
knowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/senator-stevens-speaks-net-neutrality.  The Author of this Note can 
only hope that the parties and interests deliberating the future of royalty payment schemes and 
licensing contemplated in this Note will dissect and explain the complexities of new media with such 
irreplaceable panache and clarity. 
